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ABSTRACT
Sukuk yields mimic those of conventional bonds due to having similar features. Sukuk are shariah-compliant securities 
that offer different structures to those of conventional bonds. Therefore, it is believed that the spreading of yields should 
also be different. The presence of key institutional investors/owners and certain Board of Directors (BOD) characteristics 
as highlighted by the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) may influence the yield to maturity (YTM) of 
conventional bonds and sukuk. Thus, the main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between these 
two yield spreads instruments with corporate governance mechanisms. The data is obtained from firm issuers’ annual 
reports, the Bondinfo Hub of the Malaysian Central Bank, the Rating Agency Malaysia (RAM), the Malaysian Department 
of Statistics and Bloomberg databases for the period beginning 2000 to 2014 for 256 and 405 tranches of long-term 
and medium-term issuances of conventional bonds and sukuk respectively. The most significant findings show that the 
presence of top-six and other institutional ownerships as corporate governance mechanism proxy insignificantly and 
significantly reduce yield spreads within the firm revealed by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and random effects models in 
long-term and medium-term issuances. 
Keywords: Institutional ownership; board of directors; yield spreads; robust; default risk 
ABSTRAK
Sukuk adalah sekuriti patuh-shariah yang mempunyai struktur berbeza berbanding struktur bon konvensional tetapi 
mempunyai ciri-ciri yang hampir serupa. Sehubungan itu, pembahagian julat hasil sepatutnya tidak sama. Kehadiran 
pelabur/pemilik institusi utama serta ciri-ciri Lembaga Pengarah (LP) yang tertentu yang ditekankan oleh Kod Tadbir 
Urus Korporat Malaysia (MCCG) mungkin mempengaruhi hasil hingga tempoh matang (YTM) bagi bon konvensional dan 
sukuk. Oleh itu, tujuan utama kajian ini adalah untuk menyelidik hubungan di antara julat hasil kedua-dua instrumen 
ini dengan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat. Data kajian diambil dari laporan tahunan syarikat penerbit, Bondinfo Hub 
Bank Negara Malaysia, Rating Agency Malaysia (RAM), Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia dan Bloomberg bermula dari 
tahun 2000 sehingga 2014 ke atas penerbitan bon-bon konvensional dan sukuk jangka-panjang dan jangka-sederhana, 
masing-masing sebanyak 256 dan 405 tranch. Penemuan utama menunjukkan bahawa kehadiran pemilikan enam teratas 
dan lain-lain institusi sebagai proksi mekanisma tadbir urus korporat masing-masing mengurangkan julat hasil secara 
tidak signifikan dan signifikan seperti yang diperolehi dari model ‘ordinary least squares’ dan ‘random effects’ bagi 
penerbitan jangka-panjang dan jangka-sederhana. 
Kata kunci: Pelabur institusi; lembaga pengarah; julat hasil; dinamik; risiko tidak-bayar 
INTRODUCTION 
Firms and even governments are sometimes faced with 
the problem of scarcity of funds to finance profitable 
investments and promote economic development. The 
massive amount of funding required for these purposes 
is unlikely to be serviced by commercial banks. One way 
to rise funding is from financial institutions and public 
through the issuance of debt instruments. The instruments 
used are the sale of bonds, shares, and other forms of debt 
and equity, both in conventional and Islamic systems. The 
source of funding for such projects is from the public via 
the capital market which is a platform for trading of these 
financial instruments. The increasing demand from the 
public sector for innovative forms of finance continues to 
fuel the development of Malaysia’s debt securities market. 
Growth has also been spurred by the increasing presence 
of institutional investors, such as pension funds, unit trust 
funds and insurance companies. 
Another notable achievement is the successful 
promotion of the Islamic capital market in the form of 
sukuk securities which comply with shariah principles, 
have played a major role in Malaysia’s capital market 
development, contributing to the significant growth of 
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the country’s Islamic financial system. This market has 
enjoyed enormous growth whereby USD1.814 trillion 
of assets are being managed in a shariah-compliant 
manner as of the year 2014 with the potential to increase 
to USD3.247 trillion by the year 2020. Out of this value, 
there was USD295 billion of sukuk outstanding as of 
the end of 2014 (Thomson Reuters 2015). Also, the 
Malaysian corporate bond market represented 37% of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2004 and by 
this measure; it becomes one of the largest in the world 
(IMF 2005). 
In 2014, Malaysia had a total sukuk issuance for 
MYR657 billion and leads the market with 57.6% of 
total sukuk issued from among 28 countries (Bloomberg 
2015). Even though the sukuk market is relatively new as 
opposed to the bond market for public listed firms with 
the first issued in 1990 by Shell MDS through issuing Al-
bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA) sukuk worth MYR125 million in 
Malaysia (IIFM 2012), it has recorded significant growth 
from year to year. This growth has raised the question 
whether sukuk can play the role of an alternative source of 
financing and investment which might replace or substitute 
conventional bonds (Said & Grassa 2013; Naifar 2016). 
The decision for the choice of debt financing needs to be 
analysed further on the yield to maturity (YTM) spreads 
(the difference in yield between the issuance tranche 
with Malaysian Treasury Bills for the same maturity of 
year period) for lesser risk in terms of default risk to the 
issuer. 
ISSUES AND MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY
Capital market trading is unlike the money market whereby 
short-term and medium-term securities are transacted but 
it is for medium-term and long-term debt securities (ISRA 
& SC 2015; Said W. Suhaimi & Haris 2013). Particularly, 
sukuk can be either medium to long-term issuances and can 
Source: The Author’s calculation from data on the value of country issuances obtained from Bloomberg.
FIGURE 1. The percentage of sukuk size issuances (in MYR) by Country, 2000 – 2014
have either fixed or variable rates of return and tradable or 
non-tradable (Khan & Ahmed 2001; Tariq & Dar 2007). 
Features of sukuk are identical and might be replication 
of conventional bonds such as time to maturity, coupon 
rate, trades on the normal yield price relationships, late 
payment penalty upon default, trading of debt-based 
sukuk and purchase undertaking in equity-based structures 
and therefore often resembles, conventional bonds (Taqi 
Usmani 2007; Lahsasna & Lin 2012). The similarities 
of these features between conventional bonds and sukuk 
led market participants, the mass media, public policy 
makers and some academics to describe sukuk instruments 
as mimicking conventional bonds. Therefore, there is a 
tendency among practitioners to use sukuk interchangeably 
with conventional bonds.
Studies reveal strong empirical evidence that 
conventional bonds and sukuk yields (YTM) are different 
despite having a similar tenure in Malaysia (Safari 2011; 
Ariff, Safari & Mohamed 2013; Safari & Ariff 2014). 
However, these studies did not provide a wider range of 
yield movement (yield spreads) which cause the issuer to 
default on payment as well as not comparing the sukuk 
corporate yields with conventional bonds. Sukuk has an 
innovative and flexible structure compliant to the shariah 
principles by avoiding the riba, gharar, maisir and other 
prohibited elements should have a different pattern of 
yield spreads to that of conventional bonds. Furthermore, 
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Karatas and Nienhaus (2015) commented that the series 
of these studies arrange a specifically paired sample for 
datasets measured in months (minimum for three months 
of issuances) and years (limited to 20 years only) provide 
biased comparison due to limited pairs and a larger 
range of pair samples in the observations. The long-term 
issuance is relatively lower than medium-term for each 
debt issuance. By considering these constructive comments 
on sample period, this study clustered the issuances based 
on long-term and medium-term for each debt issuance 
conventional bonds and sukuk matched with International 
Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) and 
Securities Commissions of Malaysia (SC). The clustered 
period are consistent with the data provided by the Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) Bondinfo Hub website (2014) for 
Malaysian conventional bonds and sukuk market for the 
study period covering from 2000 to 2014.
Sukuk, a relatively new asset class in global capital 
market, is facing a new challenge in the form of sukuk 
defaults like conventional bonds (Naifar & Mseddi 
2013), rather than structural problems or compliance with 
shariah law (Mat-Radzi & Muhamed 2012). Therefore, 
an analysis of debt yield spreads as a measure of default 
risk is an important issue in investment since this is one, if 
not the only, key factor in determining the cost of external 
financing borne by the issuer of debt securities. The 
inabilities to meet interest obligations and the redemption 
of the principal when they become due will not only tarnish 
the issuing firm’s corporate image, but more importantly, 
this will project a crisis of confidence among investors on 
the financial performance of the firm managed by the BOD. 
This situation leads to the discussion on the agency theory 
with respect to the separation of control and ownership and 
the issues arising from the agency cost of debt. Typically, 
higher cost of debt is associated with higher yield spreads 
which intuitively denote higher default risk among the 
issuer firms. In listed issuer firms, the growing dominance 
of equity holdings by institutional investors, both domestic 
and international, has recently sparked a debate on their 
role as effective shareholders in the monitoring of firms’ 
performance and enforcing good corporate governance 
(Davis 2002). Here, many researchers focused on the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on bonds 
yield spreads performances whereby most studies did 
not distinguish them from sukuk (Bhojraj & Sengupta 
2003; Shailer & Wang 2015; Akdogu & Alp 2016). Thus, 
the outcome of these analyses may not be appropriate 
considering that the sukuk market has greatly developed 
and has come out with various sukuk products with unique 
features which are clearly distinguish its structure from 
conventional bonds. Therefore, the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the yield spreads of sukuk 
might be different from conventional bonds in medium-
term and long-term issuances if the yield spreads between 
the two debts are not the same. Moreover, the presence 
of institutional ownerships and the BOD in corporate 
governance mechanisms will likely have a significant 
relation with medium-term and long-term conventional 
bonds and sukuk yield spreads among public listed issuers 
in Malaysia. Alternatively, one may also expect that the 
way corporate governance mechanisms impact the yield 
of sukuk is no difference to that of conventional bonds.
 Considering the issues raised, this study focuses on 
the relationship of institutional ownerships and BOD in 
corporate governance mechanisms towards yield spreads 
as a default risk for public listed issuer in Malaysia. The 
research objectives are (1) to examine the relationship 
between the presence of institutional ownerships in 
conventional bonds and sukuk issuers with their yields 
spreads in medium-term and long-term issuances, and (2) 
to examine the relationship between BOD characteristics 
of the issuer with conventional bonds and sukuk yields 
spreads in medium-term and long-term issuances.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
is a key document in Malaysia’s corporate governance 
framework and has contributed significantly in improving 
the corporate governance standards of best practice 
for Malaysian listed companies. Over the years, 
companies have demonstrated a better appreciation of 
good governance and key stakeholders. Among others, 
institutional shareholders have increasingly taken on more 
definitive and prominent role in the domestic corporate 
governance sphere. Besides institutional ownership, the 
other important mechanism in the corporate governance 
is the function of the BOD. The BOD is central to corporate 
governance mechanisms in market economics. Along with 
external markets for corporate control and institutional and 
concentrated shareholdings, it is viewed as a primary means 
for shareholders to exercise control on top management 
(Fama & Jensen 1983; Anderson, Mansi & Reeb 2004; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & LaFond 2006; Bradley & 
Chen 2011; Fields, Fraser & Subrahmanyam 2012; Chen 
2012) and separation of ownership and control leads to 
the corporate governance issues of management control 
and agency costs which require a centralised management 
delegated by shareholders to the BOD (Bohrer 2011).
There are limited empirical studies of sukuk 
investment compared to conventional bonds. Most of them 
claimed that the field of study is still new in the global 
market (Abd. Sukor, Muhamad & Gunawa 2008; Mat-
Radzi & Muhamed 2012) and remain scarce in Malaysian 
studies even though Malaysia is a market leader in sukuk 
issuances (Grail 2007). Many conceptual studies have 
been conducted (Dusuki & Abozaid 2007; Taqi Usmani 
2007) by arguing the prohibition of charging excessive 
interest rate on sukuk yields but without reference to 
empirical data. This study can fill the gap by investigating 
the determinants that influence the conventional bonds and 
sukuk yield spreads.
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INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND YIELD 
PERFORMANCE
The influence of institutional investors who have 
purchased and hold the corporate bonds and sukuk rather 
than individual investors might be a significant factor in 
yields determination. Institutional ownerships supposes 
active and greater monitoring and pressure more sensitive 
towards the performance of defaults risk as measured by 
yield spreads of conventional bonds and sukuk. Many 
researchers focused on the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on bonds yields performances (Bhojraj & 
Sengupta 2003; Liu & Jiraporn 2010; Tran 2014; Tanaka 
2014; Dutordoir, Strong & Ziegan 2014) and most of the 
studies did not distinguish between conventional bonds 
and sukuk.
The presence of active institutional investors in 
monitoring and controlling the management decision-
making focus on public listed firms invested by 
government fiduciary bodies (Shailer & Wang 2015; Abdul 
Wahab, How & Verhoeven 2008) able to reduce cost of 
debt (Shailer & Wang 2015; Sanchez-Ballesta & García-
meca 2011; Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003) which consequently 
reduce the default risk (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Halim, 
How & Verhoeven 2017). For instance, Sanchez-Ballesta 
and García-meca (2011) studied using a sample of Spanish 
listed firms indicating that ownership by the government 
in the listed firms have a relationship with the cost of debt 
whereby a higher level of ownership owned by them leads 
to having lower firm cost of debt.
However, the largest institutional ownerships need 
to collaborate with the management to ensure their 
monitoring role is significant to firm performance. 
For instance, Renneboog (1996) claimed that highly 
concentrated ownership closely controls companies 
with underperforming management however they do not 
aggressively participate in disciplining management. The 
finding is supported by Navissi and Naiker (2006) who 
postulated that institutional ownership as measured by 
active institutional investor (with board representation) and 
passive institutional investor (without board representation) 
have a relationship with firm value. Otherwise, they are not 
related to the value of the firm at lower levels of ownership. 
However, as the ownership increases, the impact on the 
value of the firm becomes negative with and without board 
representation respectively. Fields et al. (2012) also found 
a positive impact on the cost of capital debt financing if 
firms have a lower percentage of institutional ownership. 
With respect to the bond yield spreads, Boubakri and 
Ghouma (2010) explored the effect of governance on 
bond yield spreads in a multinational sample of firms. 
They found strong evidence that ultimate ownership had 
a significant positive effect on bond yield spreads. They 
concluded that a higher protection of bondholders’ rights 
reduces bond yield spreads for financial firms when they 
hold and directly control the bonds.
Inversely, bond yields reported by Manconi, Massa 
and Yasud (2010) increased during economic crisis (2007-
2008) when corporate bonds are held by institutional 
investors. The result is consistent with Ertugrul and 
Hegde (2008) who utilised OLS regression multivariate 
analysis panel dataset covering observations for 783 firm-
years. They reported that the percentage of institutional 
investors is negatively related to yield spreads. Implying 
that higher presence of these investors is able to reduce 
the default risk. Instead of captivating listed firms as a 
sample in their study, Fields et al. (2012) considered listed 
banks to investigate the relationship between institutional 
ownerships and the cost of bank debt. However, they report 
significant positive relation result. There were mixed 
results from the empirical studies when different or mixed 
samples are applied. Firms’ enhancement in mitigating the 
default risks is important to improve performance. This is 
evident in Barry, Lepetit and Tarazi (2011) who analysed 
institutional investors who hold higher equity stakes in the 
firms and found that better performance was represented 
by lower default risk. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND YIELD PERFORMANCE
The agency theory, a dominant theory applied in corporate 
governance studies, is appropriate for conceptualising 
the monitoring and resource dependency in controlling 
roles of directors. The monitoring function refers to the 
responsibility of directors to monitor the actions of agents 
which refers to managers tasks in performing business 
management. Their decision-making is necessary to 
protect the interests of principals, i.e. the shareholders. 
The board serves as the representative for shareholders 
and is the primary internal control mechanism in aligning 
the conflicting interests of shareholders and management 
(Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Marlin 
& Geiger 2012).
This is consistent with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
who is claims that the resource dependence theory is 
derived from agency theory, which explains about the 
board's monitoring function that can reduce agency costs 
inherent in the separation of ownership and control issues. 
In this issue, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) claimed that the top common of the decision 
control systems of large or small organizations, in which 
decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth 
effects of their decisions, is some form of BOD. Such BOD 
always has the power to hire fire and compensate the 
top-level decision managers and to ratify and monitor 
important decisions. Exercise of these top-level decision 
control rights by BOD helps to ensure separation of decision 
management and control even at the top of the organization 
(Fama & Jensen 1983).
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) by cited Selznick 
(1949) claimed that the earliest function of BOD can be 
viewed in resource dependency theory. The BOD function 
refers to governing board roles to minimize external 
uncertainty by exercising some level of control over 
the source of uncertainty. Thus, the theory establishes 
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a theoretical foundation for the role of directors in 
providing advice and resources (Johnson et al. 1996; 
Garcia-Torea, Fernandez-Feijoo & de la Cuesta 2016). 
They suggest that board effectiveness is determined by 
the external resources that individual members can draw 
for the benefit of the corporation. Directors reduce firm 
uncertainty by connecting the firm to the stakeholders. 
They provide advice and counsel, legitimacy, channels 
for communicating information to shareholders including 
institutional investor.
Furthermore, large shareholder action is channelled 
through the BOD. Large shareholders are in principle able 
to appoint board members representing their interests and 
exercise power by blocking ratification of unfavourable 
decisions, or possibly by initiating decisions when 
they have majority control of the board (Garcia-Torea 
et al. 2016; Chen, Hsu & Chang 2016). Therefore, the 
involvement of the BOD in reducing the agency problem 
could minimise the issue in the agency cost of debt. This 
can be seen in the recent study by Alessandra, Rossi and 
Hussainey (2016) who discussed the role of the BOD in 
the agency theory perspective. They claimed that the BOD 
could work as an information system for stakeholders to 
monitor the firm’s management decision. 
Ahn and Shrestha (2013) classified boards into 
several characteristics such as board size, composition 
and CEO-Chairman functions. They found a significant 
negative relationship between board size and agency 
cost. Concerning board composition, they report that the 
adverse impacts of classified boards can be offset or even 
superseded by the potential benefits of board classification 
for firms that hope to benefit from the advisory services 
of their independent directors. They also report that firms 
with greater advising needs appoint more outside directors 
with diverse attributes, expertise, and qualifications that 
enhance the ability to provide useful advice to managers. 
Moreover, they claim that CEO-Chairman functions benefit 
firms that have low monitoring costs and greater needs for 
advisory services.
Therefore, the roles or functions of BOD in the 
theoretical, agency and resource dependency perspective 
according to the literature discussed above can be 
summariz into two main categories. First, BOD has 
administrative functions as explained by agency theory. 
For instance, to minimize external uncertainty (Bryant & 
Davis 2012), Second, BOD have an environmental linking 
functions as explained by resource dependency theory. 
For instance, various independence resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978) and organization power to access to scarce 
resources (Bryant & Davis 2012) such as financing either 
in conventional or Islamic. Hence, both categories roles 
of board are existent in BOD characteristics as highlighted 
in corporate governance code of best practices to be 
complying.
METHODOLOGY
This study uses secondary data. The data gathered from 
various sources including BNM, RAM, SC, Bloomberg and 
Department of Statistics, Malaysia. Specifically, Data are 
retrieved from Bondinfo Hub’s website from BNM for 
issue characteristics for conventional bonds and sukuk 
including yield, number of tranches, issuer name, price 
of debt, issue date, maturity date, issue amount in MYR’ 
million and debt instrument categories. The detailed of 
the variables used and its measurement as well as the data 
sources is presented in Table 1.
Next, all the data was sorted screened and matched. 
For missing information, data are then omitted. Therefore, 
the total usable observation data for the long-term debt 
instruments are 140 issuer firms with 256 tranches 
which cover from 2000 until 2014. In medium-term debt 
instruments, the total usable observation data are 160 
issuer firms with 395 tranches from 2003 until 2014. Data 
on 2000 to 2002 were omitted due to being incomplete. 
Companies’ annual reports were downloaded from the 
respective companies’ website and Bursa Malaysia 
website. Some of the long-standing annual reports are not 
available in both websites. With that, this study collected 
the hard copy from the Knowledge Centre in Bursa 
Malaysia. An analysis of companies’ annual report on a 
yearly basis was performed manually with the purpose of 
collecting data on institutional ownerships and the BOD 
characteristics. 
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
First, separation of decision and risk-bearing functions 
becomes an effective common approach to controlling 
the agency problems (Fama & Jensen 1983) whereby 
the practise has been documented in the firms’corporate 
governance code. This code of best practise provides 
such recommendations to institutional investor for 
active monitoring and controlling cost direct to firms’ 
management through BOD. These good recommendations 
of best practice are in consistent with the shariah law 
of Islamic principles (Abu-Tapanjeh 2009). Second, 
institutional ownership theory posits that institutional 
investors can act as a monitoring and control agents to 
overcome the agency problem that arise from the issue 
of separation and control (Demestz 1983) through their 
controlling and monitoring activities (Alireza & Ali 
Tahbaz 2011). Thus, institutional investors are capable of 
influencing management performance which is driven by 
their ownership rights and ability to carry out share trading 
(Gillan & Starks 2003). Third, resource dependency 
theory is a major grounded theoretical in explaining 
about the BOD function that have an authority power on 
top management decision making for financing decision 
in reducing agency cost of debt (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; 
Marlin & Geiger 2012). 
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TABLE 1. Data description
 No Variables Description Proxy/Measurement Predicted Data
 Dependent:
 1 Yield Spreads YTM Max of YTM minus min of YTM of bonds &   BNM, RAM & SC
    sukuk issues minus with T-bills on matched
    issuance date for long- and medium-term issued.  
Independent:
Institutional Ownerships:
 2 Top-Six IO Gov The total percentage of share ownership by six  - Annual Report
    institutional owners of public listed firms. - 
 3 Others IO All IO The total percentage of share ownership by all inst. 
    owners of public listed firms except top-6 IO. -
BOD Characteristics:
 4 BODR2 CEO & Dichotomous variable. 1 if combined position  - Annual Report
   chairman of CEO and chairman and O if separated position. 
 5 BODC # of directors Dichotomous variable. 1 if independent director -
    less than 1/3 and 0 if independent director
     = @ > 1/3.  
 6 BODS # of directors Total number of directors in the firm.  -
 7 BODM Muslim  Total percentage for number of Muslim directors 
   directors  over total number of directors.  ?
Control:
 8 Volatility Price of debt Maximum minus minimum price for each 
    tranches of conventional bonds and sukuk. + BNM, RAM & SC
 9 lnSize Issue log of amount of issue in MYR (millions). -
 10 Tenure Year Maturity year period minus with issue year period. +
 11 Profit ROA Net income divided by total assets. + Bloomberg
 12 Leverage TA/TE Total assets divided by total equity. -
 13 Firm Value Tobin’s Q Total of market value of equity with book value  +
    preferred stock and book value of LTD/TA.  +
 14 Firm Size lnTA Log of total short-term assets and long-term assets. +
 15 Sustain SGR Return on common shares equity times with one 
    minus dividend payout ratio over 100. -
 16 lnGDP Current  Log of current price of Malaysian gross domestic 
   Prices product for each year issued. - Msians Statistics
In line with the agency and ownership theorists as well 
as the aforementioned empirical evidence, hypothesis 1 
and 2 is suggested as follows:
H1 Firms with greater presence of top-six institutional 
ownership have lower conventional bonds/sukuk yield 
spreads than firms with a lower presence of top-six 
institutional ownership in the long-term and medium-
term investment.
H2 Firms with greater presence of other institutional 
ownership have lower conventional bonds/sukuk 
yield spreads than firms with lower presence of other 
institutional ownership in long-term and medium-
term investment.
Then, this study developed hypotheses 3 to 6 on 
the relationships between BOD characteristics with yield 
spreads of conventional bonds and sukuk to satisfy the 
third objective of the study. Many researchers remark 
that those board members who hold two positions face 
numerous problems. Judge, Naoumova and Koutzevol 
(2003) mentioned that CEO chairs the group of people in 
monitoring and evaluating the CEO’s performance. Here, 
the conflicts of interest in the agency theory arise whereby 
the CEO monitors and evaluates his/her performance 
in that particular company. Furthermore, combined 
leadership structure in role duality is negatively related 
to firm performance (Judge et al. 2003) which supports 
the predictions of agency theory. Liu and Jiraporn (2010) 
found that the CEO who has more decision-making power 
was associated with higher yield spreads. Based on the 
abovementioned theoretical views and empirical evidence, 
it is hypothesised as follows:
H3 Firms with a separate board of directors’ role duality 
have lower conventional bonds/sukuk yield spreads 
than firms with the combined board of directors’ role 
duality in long-term and medium-term investment.
H4 Firms with more than one-third of independent 
directors have lower conventional bonds/sukuk 
yield spreads than firms with less than one-third of 
independent directors in long-term and medium-term 
investment.
H5 Firms with larger board size have lower conventional 
bonds/sukuk yield spreads than firms with less board 
size in long-term and medium-term investment.
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H6 Firms with higher BOD Muslim have lower sukuk 
yield spreads than conventional bonds in long-term 
and medium-term investment.
MULTIVARIATE PANEL ROBUST REGRESSIONS 
(MPRR)
Testing the relationship among these variables is 
considered as an estimations models for the MPRR used 
in this study. This model is developed based on debt 
instrument categories for long-term and medium-term 
conventional bonds and sukuk. Different types of issuances 
have a different effect on default risk. Besides, the effect 
in pooled OLS, within the firm as fixed effect or random 
effect is tested for each panel observation in conventional 
bonds and sukuk. 
The OLS model has treated standard error of estimations 
represented by ε as identically and independently 
distributed disturbances that are uncorrelated with the 
correlations of standard error for independent variables, 
χ  or Cor (εi , Xi) = 0. In this case, the data can be pooled, 
and OLS can be used to estimate the model with denoting 
the estimator of the slope by βOLS. The intercept and slope 
coefficients are constant across N and T represented by 
tranche issuances of each issuer which postulates that 
both the intercept and the slope are the same across 
observations. However, these assumptions might be 
restrictive and lead to heterogeneity bias needed to handle 
the robustness checks analysis. Otherwise, the model does 
not require any additional technique for such estimations. 
The regression model equation for pooled OLS can be 
represented as follows:
YieldSpredsit = βOLS + βOLS1 (Top – sixIOit) + βOLS2 (OthersIOit) 
+ βOLS3 (BODRit) + βOLS4(BODCit) + βOLS5 (BODSit) + βOLS6 
(BODMit)  + βOLS7 (Volatilityit)  + βOLS8 (InSizeit)  +  βOLS9 
(Tenureit)  + βOLS10 (profitit)  + βOLS11 Leverageit)  + βOLS12 
(FirmValueit)  + βOLS13 (FirmSizeit)  + βOLS14 (Sustainit)  + 
βOLS15 (InGDPeit)  + εit                                                                                       (1)
Then, the fixed effect model used is when the constant 
value for each tranche of issuances, xit is correlated with 
the independent variables of the issuers for the year, and 
within variation in the data only, but is the most flexible 
in that it allows for the endogeneity of regressors. This 
model also treats λi as a constant value for each tranche 
of issuances. Where:
βfe = the coefficient estimates in fixed effect of the 
explanatory variables
(βfe + λi)  = the intercept for fixed effect, and
uit = the error term for fixed effect.
With respect to the random effect model model, it 
assumes that the tranche of issuances has their intercepts 
while restricting the slope to be homogenous for yield 
spreads. Their spread is probably in random-effect as 
liquidity movement which required technique of these 
regressions as applied by Said et al. (2013) in their study. 
To accommodate such heterogeneity, the random-effect 
model decomposes the into two composite error term as 
εit = λi + uit.
STATISTICAL TESTS FOR PANEL MODEL SELECTION
In this section, statistical tests for panel model selection and 
multivariate regression results were reported in Table 3 and 
4. As discussed earlier, pooled OLS estimator is easy to use 
for estimating regression model but it does not capture the 
unobservable individual heterogeneity. In this case, fixed 
effect and random-effect estimators are used. This variety 
of approaches leaves the question about which model is 
the most appropriate in explaining the result for findings in 
Table 3. This can be solved by performing two statistical 
tests on the regression model. These are the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test (BP-LM) and Hausman 
Test. The BP-LM test tests for the existence of individual 
specific variance component or heterogeneity whether the 
pooled OLS is an appropriate model or not in interpreting 
the result. This test is important to discriminate between 
the pooled OLS and Generalized Least Squared (GLS) or 
random-effect model. The presence of the individual 
specific term, which distinguishes between these models, 
is based on the following statistical hypotheses:
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The Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) statistic follows the 
chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom as 
shown by equation as follows:
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Where:
ē =  the n × 1 vector of the group means of pooled 
regression residuals, 
e'e =  the goodness-of-fit measure or R-squared of 
the pooled OLS regression,
χ =  the correlations of standard error for independent 
variables, 
T =  the total periods, and
n =  the number of periods.
If the null hypothesis is rejected whereby the p-value 
is less 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1, it means that the random-effect 
model in unbalanced panel data is more appropriate 
than pooled OLS estimations since it is able to deal 
with heterogeneity (Breusch & Pagan 1980; Baltagi 
2001). Even if they are uncorrelated with the regressors, 
the random-effect estimator will deliver a consistent 
estimator that is also efficient. However, the results may 
be inconsistent or biased. In such a case, the study runs the 
Hausman test. The test was developed by Hausman (1978) 
for the purpose to distinguish between random-effect and 
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fixed-effect model. Therefore, the hypotheses can then be 
modified as follows:
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RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL RESULTS
The minimum value trend demonstrates a similar pattern 
to the mean value. Meaning that all the issuances tranche 
have competitive rate of yields during the contract 
initiated. However, only MTCBS, LTB, MTCB and MTS show 
a similar pattern for maximum value. But, the LTCBS and 
LTS show different patterns indicating a very high cost 
showed by value of yield spreads from LTS at 18.06%. 
Notably, the yield is refers to the different of maximum 
and minimum value for YTM which indicates the range 
of yield spreads. The finding is consistent with the theory 
of term structure of interest rate whereby longer periods 
have higher interest rate hence wider range of spreads are 
associated with higher default risks.
is more appropriate than random-effect model. This 
denotes that pooled OLS model is better suited for such 
analysis whereby the assumption of pooled OLS model 
about the error term leading to have serial correlation 
between observations and might be in the presence 
of unobservable individual heterogeneity are applied 
in this sample. Since the pooled OLS model has been 
selected, the model does need to be compared with the 
fixed effects model using the Hausman test. It is also not 
required to perform heterokedasticity diagnostic check 
test since the model has the ability to rectify the presence 
of unobservable individual heterogeneity. Therefore, 
the results from pooled OLS model are better suited for 
the analysis in LTCB. As for LTS, the null hypothesis is 
rejected suggesting that the random-effect model is more 
appropriate than pooled OLS model. Consequently, BP-
LM test confirms that RE robust model estimator is the 
selection model and as regards to the result of Hausman 
test, the chi-squared is 22.120 indicates insignificant 
result lead the decision to reject the null hypothesis.
Thus, the test confirms that random-effect for 
regression estimations model is the most appropriate 
compared with fixed-effect model in analysing the 
relationship of yield spreads towards their determinants. 
Pertaining to the selection model tests result for MTCB, the 
BP-LM test show that the chibar-squared is 1.290 with the 
probability is insignificant result. Thus, the null hypothesis 
failed to be rejected suggesting that the pooled OLS model 
is more appropriate than random-effect model. The result 
concludes that the RE robust model is the most appropriate 
model in analysing the relationship between yield spreads 
and its explanatory variables for MTS.
ROBUST REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Institutional Ownership and Yield Spreads Table 
4 shows the overall results of model selection with 
significant relationship between institutional ownerships 
TABLE 2. The results of mean, maximum and minimum of 
yield spreads 
 Yield Spreads LTB LTS MTCB MTS
 Mean  2.44 1.95 1.43 1.69
 Max  7.33 18.06 4.98 5.16
 Min  0.08 -0.52 0.02 -0.2
TABLE 3. The results of BP-LM, Hausman and Heterokedasticity test
           Test    Diagnostic Checks
              BP-LM            Hausman Heterokedasticity      Most
Panel Model Chibar-squared Prob.  Chi-squared  Prob.  Model  Chi-squared Prob. Appropriate 
          Model
A: LTCB OLS 1.290 0.128      -     - OLS 156 0.000 OLS    
 RE  73.460 0.000    
 FE     -     -      
 B: LTS OLS 6.620 0.005      -     - RE 965 0.000 RE Robust    
 RE  22.120 0.105    
 FE     -     -      
 C: MTCB OLS 1.870 0.086      -     - OLS 9800000 0.000 OLS    
 RE  87.580 0.000    
 FE     -     -      
 D: MTS OLS 74.380 0.000      -     - RE 110000 0.000 RE Robust    
 RE   23.610 0.072    
STATISTICAL SELECTION TESTS RESULTS
As a result of LTCB in Table 3, the BP-LM test show 
that chibar-squared is 1.290 with the probability is an 
insignificant result. Thus, the null hypothesis failed 
to be rejected suggesting that the pooled OLS model 
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with the yield spreads for all terms of conventional bonds 
and sukuk issuances. With respect to other institutional 
ownerships, there are mixed and inverse results revealed 
by conventional bonds and sukuk. Two panels data are met 
with the hypothesis developed, for instance; panel B and C 
for others institutional ownership but none for top-6. This 
implies that, the presence of other institutional ownerships 
is significant to reduce yields spreads in long-term sukuk 
and medium-term conventional bonds issuance.
Board of Directors and Yield Spreads The overall results 
of relationship between BOD characteristics with the yield 
spreads for all terms of conventional bonds and sukuk 
issuances have significant impact. With respect to the BOD 
role duality, it shows a significant relationship with panel 
B and C. Vindicating that, the separation role between 
chairman of directors and CEO are important determinants 
towards sukuk in long term, otherwise conventional 
bonds for medium-term issuances. Otherwise, this 
separate position is significant to the issuer in mitigating 
default risks when the medium term sukuk and long term 
conventional bond’ issued. 
Next, BOD composition shows insignificant 
relationships towards yield spreads in all types of debt 
issuances for conventional bonds or sukuk. Thus, the 
hypothesis 4 is rejected. As regards to BOD size, the finding 
shows that panel C and D have significant relationships 
towards yield spreads. It means that BOD size becomes a 
very important determinant to yield spreads especially in 
medium-term for both issuances either conventional bonds 
or sukuk. This denotes that larger size lead to higher yield 
spread in medium-term issuances. Too many directors 
are not good whereby conflict of interest may arise in 
decision making (Dutordoir et al. 2014). With respect to 
the BOD Muslim, unpredictably, higher numbers of Muslim 
directors have significant relation with yield spreads of 
conventional bonds issuances for both long-term and 
medium-term. In contrast, sukuk yield spreads indicate 
insignificant relationship with BOD Muslim.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION
There are four important implications on managerial 
issues by BOD among issuer firms. Firstly, agency theory 
TABLE 4. The results of robust regression
Debt Instrument  Panel A: LTCB Panel B: LTS Panel C: MTCB Panel D: MTS
Dependent variable: Yield Spreads  
Explanatory variables                                        Model  
 OLS RE Robust  OLS RE Robust
Intercept -0.307 4.881 21.030*** 31.350***
Institutional Ownerships: 
Top-six IO 0.001 -0.079 -0.001 0.001
Others IO 0.01 -0.110* -0.010** -0.003
Board of Directors Characteristics: 
BODR2 0.662 3.249** 0.484* -0.407
BODC -0.209 0.609 0.093 -0.167
BODS 0.076 0.063 -0.076** 0.120**
BODM 0.018* -0.037 -0.015*** -0.005
Issue Characteristics: 
Volatility 0.03 0.262** 0.243** 0.005
lnSize  -0.095 -0.198 -0.148** -0.062*
Tenure 0.003 0.074** 0.034 0.113***
Issuer Characteristics: 
Profit 0.072* -0.129 -0.100*** 0.028
Leverage -0.062 0.857* -0.048** 0.056
Firm Value 0.068 0.819 0.392** -0.840**
Firm Size  0.008 -0.493 0.031 -0.069
Sustain -0.024 0.124 0.025** 0.001***
Systematic Risks: 
lnGDP 0.082 0.275 -1.289*** -2.159***
Firm fixed effects No No No No
No of observations 112 144 157 244
R-squared 0.2503 0.5349 0.4963 0.544
Adj R-squared 0.1331 - 0.4427 -
Model Fit (F-stat) 2.14** - 9.26*** -
F-test - - - -
Wald-chi-squared - 58898.15*** - 442.97***
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highlights the roles of BOD as an agent on behalf of the 
principal to manage the firms. The management by these 
parties supposedly aligns with the Islamic principles to 
produce effective management which then lead to reducing 
default risks. Secondly, separating the chairman and CEO 
has managerial implications on their capabilities to focus 
on the business management of the company which is 
associated with a reduction in yield spreads. Thirdly, 
larger board size provides more skills that can endeavour 
to enhance firm performance in monitoring and advising 
functions that contribute to low default risks. Fourthly, 
the presence of more than one-third independent directors 
in the firm is unable to mitigate the default risks. Even 
though the MCCG suggests that the most effective board 
balance and no individual or small group of individuals 
can dominate the board’s decision beside have an ability 
to exercise a majority of votes for the election of directors, 
it has no effect on yield spreads.
Next, this study serves two categories of academic 
theory between conventional theory and Islamic principles. 
It merges and matches both categories which might be dual 
practice and consistent with the corporate governance 
code of best practice. Sukuk investment applies the halal 
theory in not only this investment financing product, but 
also the way of dealing with cost charging and how to 
manage and monitor the investment performance based 
on Islamic principles. Sukuk-holders demand halal 
investment to achieve Maqasid Al-Shariah encourage 
the issuer for both either under shariah or non-Shariah 
securities firms to offer or issue sukuk. These sukuk can 
mitigate the default risks, and the demand is expected to 
be increased in future. 
In overall, the study provides a new contribution on 
Islamic corporate governance as it might share similar 
features with Western corporate governance perspectives; 
however, the interest of stakeholders in Islamic context is 
beyond the financial return as it also covers shariah rulings 
or Islamic law and principle of Tawhid. In this principle, 
according to Chapra (1992), the stakeholders as vicegerent 
(Khilafah) of Allah SWT have fiduciary duty to uphold the 
principle of justice distribution through the of shariah’s 
board and mutual interest of group’s participation as part 
of corporate governance.
CONCLUSION
The presence of top-six institutional ownerships is unable 
to reduce default risks facing the issuer; however, the 
presence of other institutional ownerships can reduce 
default risks among issuers who issue sukuk for long-
term issuances and conventional bonds for medium-term 
issuances. BOD characteristics such as role duality, the 
number of directors and director’s religion appear to 
be significant determinants in influencing yield spreads 
except for the composition of independent directors in 
the firms. These findings offer recommendations to the 
issuer as well as institutional investors and the BOD. 
Firstly, recommendations focus on public listed issuer 
since they are actively involved in the capital market by 
issuing debt to the public. In long-run investment, they are 
encouraged to issue sukuk as compared to conventional 
bonds since the default risk is low. This justifies that the 
cost of sukuk is lower than the cost of debt in long-term 
issuances since spreading in sukuk yields is lower as 
riba or uncertainty elements is avoided. Secondly, the 
presence of institutional ownerships in the issuer firms has 
a relationship with high-low yield spreads. Their presence 
would enhance effective monitoring and control in the 
firm’s decision-making, especially in financing matters. 
Thirdly, to avoid abuse of power, biased decision and 
conflict of interest, the separation role between chairman 
and CEO to a different person is important even though 
the duties and responsibilities of this position are clearly 
highlighted in the MCCG. If it is still required, they not 
only need to follow the job descriptions of the position 
respectively but more importantly need to comply with 
Islamic principles especially Muslim BOD. 
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